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Abstract
Authenticating users in commercial smartphones is currently a naive process
putting the smartphone owner in security risks in events such as unauthorized device
sharing, device loss or theft, and session hijacking. With the recent interest of gov-
ernmental and health organizations to provide their users with applications that can
be run on their smartphones, securing these devices with measures above the cur-
rent solutions is imperative. In this research, we propose a continuous authentication
module for a Personal Health Record system that monitors its users for authenticity
over time via their touch biometrics and denies access to those who can not satisfy
authentication criteria.
The proposed solution can be used in any smartphone application that is highly
sensitive in terms of privacy and security which needs continuous authentication while
running. We will also propose a notification module that helps to build transparency
for the user about how their shared personal information is used in the system, so they
will be more willing to trust our application. The proposed continuous authentication
was implemented in an actual Personal Health Record system for Android enabled
smartphones to make it more secure and practical to use. The results show an average
precision of above 95% in detecting whether a user is the legit owner of a smartphone
or not. Finally, we composed an open-source dataset for touch biometrics and made
it available to the public. This is the first publicly available dataset related to touch
biometrics.
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Chapter 1
Preliminary Definitions
This chapter gives definitions of important terms used throughout the document.
• Cloud Computing: It provides ubiquitous, on-demand access-through-network
to a shared set of configurable computing devices that could easily be provi-
sioned and released with least management requirements or interactions from
the service provider parties [28].
• Internet of Things: It is a relatively new concept that has attracted much
attention in the scenario of wireless telecommunication. The main idea behind
it is the universal presence of a variety of things (objects) around us such as
different sensors, actuators and smartphones which are able to communicate
with each other to reach a unified objective [5].
• Internet of Everything: This is a more pervasive realization of Internet of
Things. As processing capabilities of computing devices increases and as more
and more people use smart devices and connect them to each other in more
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valuable and meaningful ways, Internet of Things moves towards Internet of
Everything [8].
• Computer Security: When talking about computer security, the goal is to
address three important aspects of any computing system: confidentiality to
ensure only authorized parties can access assets, integrity to make sure that
the correctness of assets is guaranteed and only authorized parties can modify
them, and availability to certify that assets are available to authorized parties
whenever they need them [37].
• Computer Privacy: this term refers to the rights of users of computing devices
to specify to whom, how, when and in what details they are willing to share
their personal information [48].
• Authentication: In a communication between two parties, authentication as-
sures both sides that they know each other’s actual identity [14].
• Authorization: In an environment with multiple users and shared assets, it
is essential to limit access privileges (authorizations) to different parties. For
example, in a database, available authorization types can be read, write and
create which can be granted to some users and denied from some others [39].
• Encryption: It is involved with translating data from an understandable for-
mat to a meaningless ”encrypted” one and is commonly used to protect sensitive
information from unauthorized parties [1].
• Anonymization, randomization and suppression: A dataset of private in-
formation usually has attributes that can lead to revealing the identity of people.
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Anonymization sanitizes data aiming to reduce leakage of private information.
Randomization is the process of adding noise to a dataset and suppression is
about hiding parts of data that can result in information disclosure.
• Challenge-response protocol: It is used to authenticate parties. The flow
of this protocol is as below [7]:
– Alice sends an ID to Bob in order to identify herself to Bob.
– Bob sends a challenge related to the sent ID back to Alice.
– Alice sends a response to the challenge along with a data element if she
validates the challenge. The response is based on the sent data element.
– Bob accepts the data element if he validates the response.
• One Time Password (OTP): OTP can be a sheet of paper containing pass-
words or an electronic device that is able to generate different passwords each
time requested. Ideally, a malicious user fails to impersonate a party without
having access to that sheet of paper or the electronic device [34].
• Usage session: A usage session starts right after a user is authenticated to use
a system until the privilege is taken away from them for whatever reason. In
most smartphones, a usage session is usually the time between entering a lock
or pin code, and switching the screen off.
• Session hijacking: It is a client-side attack which happens when a malicious
user steals the session information related to a rightful user of a specific website
and uses that information to override authentication to that website [32].
3
• Personal Health Record (PHR) system: Its main objective is to give
the full control of health information access to the patient as the data owner.
It also enables fast sharing of patient information with physicians and health
professionals and helps with reducing the need for storing patients’ information
on papers, allowing them to have their whole medical history in one place. [13].
• Biometrics: Generally, it is defined as any personal physical characteristic
that is automatically measurable, robust and distinguishable and can be used
to identify a party [51].
• Social engineering: It is an approach for unauthorized access to personal
information of computing devices via non-technical means. As an example, one
can call a library information service, trying to impersonate a library member.
He asks the server if his postal address has been updated in the library directory,
giving the member’s name as the identifier. The clerk looks the name up, and
reads the current address to the impersonator. In this scenario the malicious
user has gained unauthorized access to someone’s postal address through non-
technical means [44].
• Digital signature: Generally, it is considered as a set of features extracted
from an entity, stored somewhere such as a file or database table for later
authentication purposes. A significant trait of digital signature is that it is
enough to substantially represent the content of the original entity, so that if it
is tampered with, the receiving party will know, verifying the digital signature
with the entity’s content [26].
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• Pattern recognition: It is the process in which specific persons or machines
understand complex and seemingly independent events as identifiable patterns.
It is the principal idea behind almost every machine learning technique [6].
• Classification: It is the process of categorizing a dataset into mutually exclu-
sive groups in a way that all the members in a group are as similar as possible
to each other while being as far as possible in comparison with the members of
the other groups [20].
• Bayesian network: It is a mathematical approach that represents a joint
probability distribution P among a set variables V . A bayesian network is
usually used to model domain knowledge, especially in medicine [45].
• Genetic Programming: It is an inductive machine learning technique that
evolves a computer program to accomplish a predefined task by a collection of
stated examples and has been applied to complex, nonlinear problems, especially
where the domain of the solution is not known or easily guessable [50]
• Support Vector Machine (SVM): This technique is a powerful statistical
learning method which is used for binary-class classifications. It is capable of
finding non-linear solutions for complex problems which other machine learning
techniques can not find appropriate solutions for [46].
• Overfitting: Overfitting is a problem that can happen in many machine learn-
ing techniques such as SVMs and bayesian networks. It occurs when a complex
generated model performs better on training data than a simpler one but per-
forms worse on test data [31].
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• Application Programming Interface (API): It is a set of functions, proto-
cols and resources for developing software applications. APIs allow developers
to use third-party services much more easily [2].
• Integrated Development Environment (IDE): It is a programming envi-
ronment with a graphical user interface, a text editor for writing codes, a com-
piler and/or interpreter and also, a debugger. Examples of IDEs are Eclipse,
JBuilder, DreamWeaver and WebStorm [3].
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Chapter 2
Introduction
Before 1990s, computing devices, were mostly isolated and keeping them secure was
usually considered as a human task, done by the administrator of the devices. After
the Internet stepped into the computing world, and we slowly began to realize the
distributed computing capabilities of connected devices, things changed a lot and
everything became much more complicated.
Cloud computing, Internet of Things or even Internet of Everything are the most
recent realizations of the Internet revolution back in 1990s, enabling highly scalable
distributed environments where data and information are not kept inside an isolated
computing device, but are rather distributed amongst a huge amount of computing
nodes all around the world. In such a distributed environment, keeping sensitive data
and information secure is not a human task done by a sole administrator.
In our modern world, the Internet revolution has introduced lots of challenges
in the field of security and privacy. A lot of research has been done to address
these challenges. Solutions such as authentication, authorization, anonymization,
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randomization, suppression, and different types of encryption over sensitive data are
amongst the products of research done in this field.
One of the well-known solutions to secure a computing system is authentication.
Basically, authentication is done via entering a password before having access to a
sensitive source. This approach is the most straightforward mechanism for making
sure a party is authenticated. However, recently, the authentication process has been
enriched with other mechanisms such as challenge-response questions, security tokens,
one time passwords (OTP) and two-step verifications.
With different sensors, computing devices can master more complex and accurate
authentication approaches, as well. Using built-in cameras and finger-print read-
ers, biometric authentication can be used in computing devices. However, these
approaches usually require special conditions to operate properly and are also expen-
sive.
The biggest problem with such approaches is that the whole process will be done
once, initially, hence putting the computing system at security risks such as unau-
thorized device sharing, device lost/theft and session hijacking [43]. These security
risks are more visible when the computing systems we are referring to are portable
smartphones.
Smartphones have become inseparable entities from our everyday life. Our gen-
eration is highly dependent on the functionalities introduced by such devices, to the
extent that life can get extremely difficult without them. Also, the technology in the
field grows so fast that currently the computational landscape has changed drastically
and in some scenarios smartphones outperform laptops and desktops [10]. Having this
in mind, it’s a legit assumption that currently, there are more security risks to address
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with regards to smartphones in comparison with traditional laptops and desktops.
Figure 2.1: OS Device Shipments, 2015 [4].
According to [4], smartphones having Android Operating System (OS), are the
most popular devices in the world. See Figure 2.1 for details on OS device shipments
in 2015. The most frequently used authentication methods in smartphones having
an Android Operating System are entering an unlock pattern, or a short-length pin
code and touching a sequence of specific areas on the screen. These methods are
all considered as static authentication, meaning they run only at the beginning of a
usage session.
Static authentication may seem convenient for most scenarios in using a smart-
phone, and actually is the only authentication mechanism that is available in com-
mercial smartphones nowadays. On the other hand, continuous authentication is a
whole other concept in the way users are authenticated and monitored to stay so,
throughout the whole session of device usage.
Acquiring information about user’s biometrics sounds like a great idea for enabling
continuous authentication. In the most naive approach, the user can be asked to
provide biometric information such as fingerprints or iris pattern via some sensors,
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every few seconds or minutes. This approach is not really practical for multiple
reasons. Providing sensors for reading fingerprints or iris patterns is costly. Also, it
will be a huge burden for the user to provide such information every now and then.
Moreover, providing information such as iris pattern requires special conditions, such
as enough light intensity and having a front camera.
Recently, research has been done on considering touch behavior of smartphone
users as a biometric feature, hence making it possible to create a model of the behavior
of a smartphone owner and deciding if the current user is the actual owner or not.
This approach is gaining popularity because it requires no extra sensors and peripheral
devices to be connected to smartphones. All the required information for creating
such a model will be gathered from touch sensors that are already there in all touch
enabled smartphones.
As mentioned before, continuous authentication can help preventing risks such as
unauthorized device sharing, device lost or theft and session hijacking. These risks
are more pronounced when smartphones have sensitive applications and information
installed on them. Health-care applications are indeed amongst the most sensitive
applications and recently, people tend to use these types of applications on their
smartphones more frequently.
Using touch dynamics as a biometric feature for smartphones can help a lot in this
scenario, where users are not only asked to pass through a traditional authentication
method, but also will be continuously monitored so that they will stay authenticated
throughout the whole usage session.
In this proposed research, the main focus will be on applying continuous authenti-
cation on a secure revocable Personal Health Record (PHR) System, done by Debnath
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et al. [13], to make it robust against the shortcomings of traditional approaches for
authentication. Such a system will be used to share patient’s information among
health professionals very quickly. However, since the information being shared is sen-
sitive personal healthcare information, highest security measures must be involved in
the whole process. All the information in the system is stored in an encrypted man-
ner to minimize the security risks that reside in the communication between different
parties of the application.
In this research, the concerns regarding authentication of the user will be studied
and a continuous authentication mechanism will be proposed that ascertains that
once a user is authenticated, they will stay so, unless the usage session is terminated
deliberately. This is a huge concern, because once someone has been authorized to
access such a sensitive application and the information inside it, no encryption mech-
anism can help. In order to realize this ongoing authentication process, a smartphone
owner’s touch biometrics will be considered as the criteria for detecting the authen-
ticity of the current user of the smartphone.
A classification model will be created based on the touch behavior of a user (the
way a user touches the screen of their smartphone) that will be used later on to tell
if the current touch behavior - while using an application such as PHR - belongs to
the rightful user or not. The touch behavior information will be gathered using an
Android application called “TouchSense”, developed as a byproduct of this research.
The dataset, gathered by TouchSense will be made available to the public, so that
other researchers can easily have access to an open-source, well-documented touch
dynamics dataset.
Also, a detailed notification and audit module design for the PHR application will
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be proposed to let its users have more control over their sensitive documents, stored
in the application and provide a transparent approach for the users to revoke the
access of the different roles involved in the system to their documents.
In the next chapter a literature review will be presented about the related work
in the field of authentication. In Chapter 4 research questions and objectives will
be outlined followed by the research methodology, while Chapter 5 describes the
implementation of the proposed approach. In Chapter 6, the results of the research
are presented. Finally concluding remarks and future work are given in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
As mentioned in the previous chapter, authentication is one of the oldest, yet most
common approaches to provide security for a computing system. Authentication is
the first and most important line of defense in a system of trusted and open networks.
The authentication mechanisms proposed in [49, 9, 23], are among the first efforts
to create robust techniques by solving problems such as revealing of a password by
gaining access to stored information in a system and preventing information leakage
by intercepting a user’s communication.
Wegman et al. [49], in 1981, provided solutions such as avoiding storing passwords
as plain-texts in a computing system and encrypting the information to be commu-
nicated, to address the two problems above. However, they indicate that solving the
problem with inadvertent password disclosure is not as straightforward as hashing
mechanisms and encryption systems. They hint that using some mechanisms for
physically recognizing the user entering a password, such as a voice signature, can be
a solution to alleviate the challenge.
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As different approaches for authentication will be reviewed in the rest of this
section, we will see that mechanisms involved with physically distinguishing different
users are referred to as biometrics and have been a vibrant field of research. More
recent examples of research in the field of human biometrics for authentication can
be found in [18, 38, 47, 22].
The most preliminary and also most widely used authentication mechanism is us-
ing password. Generally, the user provides an identifier such as a user name or a token
card, along with a password, in order to be authenticated. In most secure systems
the password entered will not be stored as plain-text. Password authentication has
several vulnerabilities such as:
• Password might be easy to guess.
• It may be revealed by writing it down and leaving it in a highly visible area.
• Eavesdropping and social engineering can help password discovery [15].
One-time passwords are another mechanism for authentication which help in
adding more security to a computing system. McDonald [27] claims that in the 1990s,
a major attack was to passively capture and replay passwords in order to authenti-
cate users. To prevent such attacks they suggest password encryption to create an
encrypted password that can be used only once, and cannot be reused to create other
passwords. Such an encoded password is referred to as one-time password. Goyal et
al. have improved the idea of one-time password by securing it against eavesdropping
and server database collusion, simultaneously [19].
There are scenarios where authenticating communicating parties is not necessary.
As an example, when downloading an application update, the application server does
14
not need to authenticate the user who is downloading the update, and the user is not
worried about which server to download the update from. However, the user would
like to make sure that the data to be downloaded is from a trusted, non-malicious
source. In such scenarios, digital signature is considered as an authentication ap-
proach [15].
Using biometric features such as fingerprint, iris pattern and voice signature can
help us create robust authentication systems. With the recent progresses in pattern
recognition, there are already sensors on commercial computing devices that can sense
these patterns and classify them with an outstanding performance and accuracy [40].
Levy et al. propose a random fingerprint biometrics authentication process for the
users of e-learning courses [24]. They indicate that implementing such authentication
is presumed to reduce exam cheating in e-learning environments. This approach
performs well for online courses, because they provide a hassle free environment for
users to use a fingerprint sensor in order to be identified. Such an approach would
not perform well in environments where users may wear gloves, need a quick response
time for using a computing system or even have greasy fingers.
As mentioned, there are challenges for using such authentication mechanisms. As
another example, image processing has had a great progress over the course of time,
however the sensor which takes a photo of the user’s eyes for iris pattern recognition,
say a smartphone’s front camera, should be able to record high quality images so
that the classification can perform reasonably. Also, the environment has a huge
effect on such biometric authentication approaches. Light intensity can affect the
images recorded from a smartphone’s camera, and noisy environments can reduce the
performance of speech recognition [43].
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Since availability is an essential security guaranty, an authentication method
should always be available. The problems mentioned about physiological biomet-
rics violate the availability of related approaches. However biometrics are not limited
to only physiological features such as fingerprint, voice and iris pattern. There are
behavioral biometrics, as well. As an example, the pattern in which a user is working
on their laptop’s keyboard can be a unique behavior, making it a behavioral biomet-
ric feature for that user. Some authentication systems using keystroke dynamics are
proposed in [35, 11, 52].
However, limiting the solutions to secure authentication challenge to only physi-
cal keyboards and its keystroke dynamics, neglects a vast group of computing devices
that are part of our everyday lives. Most of today’s commercial smartphones don’t
have a built-in physical keyboard. Instead, they can sense touch dynamics. The most
common used keyboards in smartphones are soft keyboards which respond to user’s
touches on the screen. Recent research has shown that touch dynamics can be consid-
ered as a good source for behavioral biometrics that can enable user authentication
[30, 42, 29].
Traditional authentication methods such as passwords and lock patterns or pass-
codes are widely used in commercial smartphones. Given the fact that smartphone
usage is usually in short intervals of time [17] unlike desktop computers, authenticat-
ing users, using password or passcode entry can be a cumbersome demand from the
user. This is why smartphones should be able to continuously authenticate the user
in the background with the least involvement from them.
User authentication can be done continuously, by constantly monitoring the user’s
touch dynamics. This way a user can steadily get authenticated beyond the initial
16
authentication. This possibility is one of the most noticeable advantages of using
touch biometrics over other physiological biometrics [43]. Ensuring that a user will
be continuously authenticated is also a great security guarantee for sensitive applica-
tions that can be run on smartphones. Recent interest of banks, governmental and
healthcare organizations to provide mobile applications for their users, increases the
need for such robust authentication approaches in commercial devices.
Among the most recent trends in healthcare applications are Personal Health
Record (PHR) systems. PHR enables fast sharing of patient information with physi-
cians and health professionals. It totally eliminates the need for storing patients’
information on papers and allows patients to have their whole medical history in one
place. [13].
According to [25], one of the big barriers of a successful implementation of PHR
systems is security concerns that users have. Security and privacy issues are a prin-
cipal barrier for implementing PHR systems. People usually don’t like to store their
personal health information in applications they don’t trust. Sending information
to third party cloud infrastructures requires a solid trust between users and cloud
provider. Debnaht et al. [13] have proposed a solution to make PHRs more secure
by implementing a secure revocable policy-based system with a fine grained access
control mechanism. Its main purpose is to protect against untrusted cloud service
providers, and malicious users. Also, a hierarchical access revocation method is pro-
posed in this research which allows a user to revoke any other users’ access to their
private information at any time, instantly.
One of the questions that needs an answer in order to find solutions for such trust
issues is that how can a mobile health system show its users, in a fluent manner,
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what data is being stored, what are the inferences that could be made based on the
shared data, and where and how the information would be used. The user receives
notifications if any violations occur regarding the policies agreed-upon [21].
Also, implementing a continuous authentication system that can guard the sensi-
tive PHR information accessible on the user’s smartphone from malicious users, can
reduce this concern and make PHR systems more usable and practical. Having con-
tinuous authentication in place, guarantees that a smartphone is actually used by its
owner, and prevents access to sensitive data when the smartphone is being used by a
different person.
There are challenges in implementing continuous authentication, especially when
the targets are smartphones. The biggest challenge is that there is no open-source
usable dataset for users’ touch dynamics accessible for researchers, imposing them to
go through a cumbersome survey and data gathering process to be able to work on
improving models for touch dynamics.
Another important consideration for implementing such mechanisms is minimizing
power consumption. Decreasing sampling rate [36, 33] and holding complex opera-
tions until the device is being charged [12] are among the solutions to reduce power
consumption.
Since this is a data classification problem, choosing a suitable classifier is a chal-
lenge. Bayesian network is one of the popular classifiers used for classifying touch
dynamics data [16]. Saevanee et al. [41] proposed a classifier using a probabilistic
neural network. They claim that using only the finger pressure feature to feed in the
neural network classifier produces a high accuracy rate of 99%.
Accuracy maximization is another crucial challenge in implementing continuous
18
touch dynamics authentication. In creating models for instrumenting a classifier, it
is desirable to have a low false positive rate also referred to as miss alarm rate or
Type I error. In our context, keeping the false positive rate down means less invalid
users being falsely accepted. Also, the false negative rate should be as low as possible,
meaning fewer valid users being falsely rejected.
Since user’s touch dynamics behavior can change over time, data adjustment is
done to update the templates stored, indicating a user’s touch behavior. In [12],
a method is proposed that can capture such gradual changes and update the base
templates after each successful authentication.
Taking into account all the challenges, and possibilities to progress, the next
chapter will address research questions and objectives of this thesis along with the
research methodology.
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Chapter 4
Research Questions and
Methodology
A user can get authenticated using multiple authentication methods, as discussed in
the previous chapter.
In the previous chapter, we mentioned that the most challenging barrier in the
way of implementing PHRs practically is users’ trust into using such an application
in a secure way. Gaining users’ trust does not seem to be easy, considering entering
an unlock pattern, inputting a short-length pin code or touching a sequence of spe-
cific areas on the screen are the most common authentication approaches on today’s
commercial smartphones which are all prone to many security issues.
A crucial research question would be, how to gain users’ trust and help them use
sensitive applications with an ease of mind on their smartphones. As a result, the
main objective of this research is to design a continuous authentication approach using
touch dynamics behavior of users to authenticate them on the go, in the background,
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all the time.
The next research question is how to provide a mechanism for PHR systems -
that are mainly involved with giving access to sensitive health data of different users
to a hierarchy of different medical roles - so that users know whenever their data is
accessed via another role in the application. These accesses can fall into two main
categories: valid accesses and invalid ones.
Another objective is to design a notification module that can be used in PHR
systems, so that users can define what notifications about which types of accesses
and events in the system they want to receive. Such a notification module will take
the responsibility to keep the user informed of any selected event that is related to
their sensitive information stored in the system.
Last but not least, the absence of an open-source dataset for studying touch
dynamics is a huge burden for every researcher interested in the field. A by-product
of this thesis is a complete and well documented dataset related to touch dynamics
of different users, available to public.
To summarize, based on the raised questions, the goals of this research are as
follows:
• Preparing an open-source dataset for touch biometrics accessible to all re-
searchers interested in researching on continuous authentication. This is a pre-
requisite for creating our continuous authentication mechanism.
• Implementing a continuous authentication mechanism using touch biometrics
on Android smartphones to be able to authenticate the user continuously, in
the background.
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• Integrating the created continuous authentication mechanism into PHR.
• Designing a detailed notification system for PHR so that the user can under-
stand who accesses their sensitive information and when.
To fulfill the mentioned objectives, in the reminder of this chapter, the research
methods involved and the required steps will be illustrated.
4.1 Composing an open-source dataset for touch
dynamics
As mentioned earlier, an open-source dataset for touch dynamics can be a really
valuable asset for the researchers in this field. On top of that, it is an essential
ingredient for this research to create a continuous authentication system.
As a result, one of the contributions of this thesis is to compose a well-documented
dataset that the whole classifier model creation process will be built upon. The
dataset will be available to the public, so that it can be used in other research on
continuous authentication using touch biometrics.
In order to create such a dataset the following stages were completed:
4.1.1 Data Collection
After studying the related work done in this field and considering some innovative
ideas, the following features were gathered using our “TouchSense” Android applica-
tion, which will be fully described in section 5.1.3.
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• Pressure: this feature indicates the pressure applied by the user’s touch action
on the screen. This is a normalized value between 0 and 1. The closer to 1, the
heavier the pressure.
• Size: this feature indicates the size of the user’s touch action, i.e. the number
of pixels affected on the screen. This is a normalized value between 0 and 1.
The closer to 1, the bigger the size.
• Touch Major: this feature reports the major axis of an ellipse that represents
the touched area by the user.
• Touch Minor: this feature reports the minor axis of an ellipse that represents
the touched area by the user.
• Duration: this feature represents the time interval from the moment a finger
touches the screen up until when the finger looses contact with it. The value is
stored in milliseconds.
• Fly Time: this feature depicts the time interval between each consecutive
touch and is stored in milliseconds. It has more meaning when we are interested
in touch biometrics for typing words or numbers. In this context fly time means
the time consumed between finishing typing a character and starting to type
the next one.
• Shake: This feature records the amount of the vibration of the smartphone
while the user performs touch events. This basically shows the speed that the
device moves from point (x1, y1) to point (x2, y2). In this research we would
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like to see the results of considering this feature as an innovative biometric for
touch behavior.
• Orientation: This feature records whether the touch behavior has been
recorded while the device was in the landscape orientation or the portrait one.
A value of 1 represents portrait while a value of 2 depicts landscape.
• Word or Number: This feature records whether the touch behavior belongs
to typing in a word or a number. A value of 1 represents typing a word while
a value of 2 indicates typing a number.
4.1.2 Determining the optimal feature set for model creation
The review helped defining an initial set of features for creating a dataset that will
be used in the training, test and validation processes to create the final classifiers.
Defining the optimal feature set is a challenging task because taking too many
features into account can lead to an overfitted model which can perform well, only
for the training dataset. On the other hand, having too few features will result in a
very general and simple model that can not guarantee a high accuracy classifier. The
trade-off in here needs to be fine tuned via a series of trial and error experiments in
order to reach the optimal feature set. A detailed experiment will be illustrated in
Chapter 6 to discuss how the most contributing features have been selected to create
the classifiers.
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4.1.3 Designing a mobile application to gather touch data
An android application was developed called TouchSense. It was made available to
the public via Google Play Store 1. The details of how it was implemented will be
addressed in Chapter 5. The application was implemented in such a way that it
prompts the user to type in 30 random words or numbers and while the user interacts
with the keyboard, it listens for the touch inputs corresponding to those actions and
stores them in a data file. Once all the 30 prompts are fulfilled, the application sends
the aggregated data to a secure Amazon S3 server along with the smartphone’s unique
Android ID for further processing and composing the actual dataset.
There were a couple of limitations applied to TouchSense which will be discussed
below:
• Listening to touch behavior while typing: In an application like PHR or
any other sensitive mobile application such as mobile banking and electronic
government applications, an action which happens most frequently is typing in
some words and/or numbers. They could be prompted because of a password
requirement, or simply because the user needs to fill in a form to submit in the
application. It was decided that listening to all of the touch events may result
in deriving a poor classifier as a touch biometric for each user. This limitation
was applied because, usually each user has a special typing behavior. Hence,
listening to only those touch events that are related to typing could provide us
with a more informative dataset.
• Frequency of Words vs. Numbers: We decided to show random words for
1available at: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.mun.navid.touchsense
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the user to type in more often than prompting them for numbers. In fact the
probability of a user being prompted to type in a word is 70% while a number
will be shown only 30% of the times. This is because, usually applications such
as PHR are involved with filling in forms that contain mostly fields dealing with
alphabetic characters rather than numeric values.
• Custom Soft Keyboard vs. Android Soft Keyboard: For security rea-
sons, Android OS masks all the touch events when a user uses the Android soft
keyboard as an input mechanism. This input medium is launched as a third
party application when the user wants to input some text in a form inside an
application such as PHR. Unfortunately, since all the touch events are masked
by default, there is no practical way to listen to touch events when using the
standard Android keyboard except for rooting the device.
However, rooting a device is an advanced operation and is not something that
general users are willing to do in order to have an extra feature incorporated
in their phones. It also involves some risks such as causing damage to the OS
or even bricking the phone. Creating custom soft keyboards in Android is a
common practice. In fact one can design a custom keyboard that looks just like
the standard Android keyboard with almost the same functionality. We decided
- instead of requiring a rooted smartphone which would significantly reduce the
targets of our research - to implement a custom keyboard and use that instead
of the standard one to gather touch information.
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4.1.4 Processing the raw aggregated data
Some of the features gathered required preprocessing before a classifier model could
be created based on the dataset. Since the application was available to the public,
and there could be no limitations on the devices used during each experiment, and
due to often drastic variances in installed Android operating systems on each brand
of smartphone, the gathered data had to be preprocessed.
After the dataset was collected it was noticed that among the 41 participants’
devices, 22 of them would store a value of 1.0 for the touch pressure feature in all
events, i.e. those devices could not sense the amount of pressure applied by a touch
action and would simply send a value of 1.0 instead, to indicate that a touch event has
happened, while the other 19 devices could perfectly store accurate values for each
pressure applied to the screen. Considering all those data in one bucket would be
inappropriate and would result in misleading higher accuracy in the classifiers made
for each device.
To prevent this problem, it was decided to create two categories. One for those
participants whose devices could sense the applied pressure and one for those without
this ability. With this approach the classifier models for each device could be built
based on the category that they belonged to.
Additionally, all the outliers of the data had to be removed from the dataset
before any further attempts to create the classifier models. Smartphone users can not
always be persistent with the way that they interact with their devices, hence there
could be some outliers in the raw data gathered from each device. To remove those,
Weka’s preprocessing filter called InterquartileRange - a filter for detecting outliers
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and extreme values based on interquartile ranges - was used.
4.2 Designing a continuous authentication module
The most important goal of this research is to provide PHR and potentially all sen-
sitive applications in medical, banking and governmental areas with a continuous
authentication module that can learn the way users interact with their smartphones
through recording their touch behavior and creating a model from the gathered data.
To realize this objective, a set of consecutive steps were taken which will be covered
next.
4.2.1 Composing .arff files from the gathered raw data
To create our classifier models we will be using Weka application. Weka stands for
Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis and is a suite of machine learning
software written in Java and has been developed at the University of Waikato, New
Zealand. It is a free software licensed under GNU General Public License.
To perform a machine learning task, one needs a dataset. We already described
how we composed our datasets in the previous section. However, it is not possible to
use the composed datasets in Weka unless they are converted to a specific file format
with .arff extension. This file format is the most standard one that Weka accepts as
an input for data mining tasks. In Figure 4.1, an example dataset in this format is
illustrated.
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Figure 4.1: An example arff file, composed from the gathered raw data, that Weka
accepts as an input for our data mining process.
According to Figure 4.1, an arff file starts with “@RELATION” followed by a
string that indicates the name of the relation. Following the relation name, there
are multiple lines starting with “@ATTRIBUTE”. Each such line indicates a feature
used in the relation, plus a line indicating the class of the relation. For our dataset,
as we mentioned earlier, we used 9 features hence, we have 10 lines starting with
the “@ATTRIBUTE” tag, with the last one depicting the relation’s class. In this
example we have two classes, “5b454e4ad8ae49f9”, which is the AndroidID of one of
the participants’ devices and “Others”, indicating data gathered from all the other
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devices.
Each feature attribute has a name and a type. In the above example, you can
see the names used for the features and the types that each feature’s value should
be stored. After pointing out all the attributes, the next line is a single “@DATA”
followed by as many data rows that there are in the dataset. In Figure 4.1, you
can see the first 15 rows of the gathered data for a user with the AndroidID of
“5b454e4ad8ae49f9”. An important thing to notice in the order of the represented
data in each line is that data should be stored with the exact same order that the
attributes have been defined and it should be comma-separated. Also, the last item
in each line indicates the class that the row belongs to.
4.2.2 Choosing an appropriate machine learning technique
The next step, after preparing the required arff files for each participant, is to use
a machine learning technique in order to create a user-customized classifier model.
Researchers have used a variety of different techniques such as Naive Bayes Network,
Genetic Programming (GP), Neural Network (NN) or Support Vector Machine (SVM)
and have obtained different results.
Undoubtedly, the appropriate technique must be chosen based on the complex-
ity of the defined problem space. Some techniques perform better when the model
tends to be non-linear, some other are more preferable for providing linear models as
the solution. Some models require a very long training time and some have notice-
ably higher response time that contradicts the need to use online classification in an
application like PHR.
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Based on the literature review, creating a classifier for a user’s touch dynamics
is definitely a non-linear problem. Hence, MultilayerPerceptron, RandomCommittee
and J48 were chosen as possible better options for deriving non-linear models from
the compiled datasets. In Chapter 6, a set of experiments have been done to find
out which technique can lead to better performance according to the datasets that
have been instrumented. On top of that, the selected technique will be compared to
a BayesNet classifier which has been used as the machine learning technique in most
of the research in this field.
The nominated techniques will be benchmarked in different scenarios and the
one that can create a model with the lowest False Positive and False Negative rate
will be chosen. Having a lower False Positive rate is of more importance in our
application since we would like to create models that will perform better on detecting
unauthorized users correctly, i.e., it could be tolerable, to some extent, if the classifier
doesn’t recognize a smartphone user as the legit owner but it would not be a desirable
behavior if the model produces a high chance of incorrectly classifying unauthorized
users as the legit ones. It should be taken into consideration that the desired model
should be as general as possible while having a high accuracy at the same time.
4.2.3 Creation of the models
Now that we have our arff files ready, and we have selected an appropriate machine
learning technique, the next step is to create our classifier models. For this purpose, we
developed a J2EE application that automates the whole model creation process. Once
the application is run, all the existing raw data gathered from different participants
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are downloaded from a designated S3 bucket called “touch-info”. Each downloaded
file will be keyed based on the device’s AndroidID, thus giving us the opportunity
to create participant specific arff files and classifier models using the AndroidID that
has been recorded.
Then, the corresponding arff files will be composed automatically based on what
we described in the previous section. These arff files will be considered as the training,
testing and validation dataset for our next step which is using Weka’s Java API to
build a classifier model with 10-fold cross validation.
After each model is created, it will be named using the participant’s AndroidID
and will be stored as a model file which is a serialized format that Weka uses to
save a classifier model. When all the models are created locally, they will be then
uploaded to another S3 bucket, called “model-info”, keyed with the same AndroidID
used to store the arff files. Having the keyed model files, accessible via an S3 bucket
is considered the first practical step towards enabling continuous authentication in
our PHR application.
In the next section, we will describe how the prepared models are used in our
PHR application.
4.2.4 The design of the module
After successfully creating the models, the next step is to use the users’ models as a
functional module in our PHR application. Once the classifier model is there in the
application, giving inputs to it will result in the desired classification results. The
implementation objective is to get touch inputs from a user’s actions when using the
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PHR application: In this scenario, the first thing that PHR does is to send a
request to the S3 server’s “models-info” bucket, checking if there exists a model
file with the same name as the device’s AndroidID. It will find the model file
and will request a push operation from the bucket to the PHR application’s
shared memory. Once the file is loaded into the memory successfully, it will be
written into the PHR’s cache so that it can be used later on.
When the model is in place, the whole process that was mentioned in Figure
4.2 will become functional.
• A new user who has not participated in “TouchSense” will run our
PHR application: In this scenario, our PHR application has already sent a
request to the S3 server’s “models-info” bucket along with the AndroidID of
the device and S3 has replied with a “file not found” message. When PHR
receives this message, it will automatically pop up a warning that in order
to enable continuous authentication the user needs to install the “TouchSense”
application from Google Play Store and participate in the data gathering process
at least once, so that a personalized classifier model can be created for the new
user.
There will be a URL in the pop-up that can direct the user to the “TouchSense”
application page in Google Play Store, so that they can install it easily. Af-
ter the user finishes participating in the data gathering process, our automatic
model creator describe in Section 5.2.3 will build the customized classifier for
the AndroidId corresponding to their smartphone and will upload it to the S3’s
“models-info” bucket. The user will be prompted to restart their PHR applica-
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tion, and upon the next run of the application the first scenario mentioned above
will take place and the user will be able to use the continuous authentication
module.
4.3 Designing a Detailed Notification System
Unarguably, users do not tend to trust an application involved with their sensitive
information such as banking transactions and health records unless they can under-
stand, transparently, where their information is stored and how it will be accessed
by other parties in the application. The main goal of designing a notification system
for PHR is to update its users with any actions done by other parties that require
accessing their information.
Most of the current health applications, in particular PHRs don’t provide this
type of transparency to their users. However, it is inevitable that without having
users’ trust there is not a big chance for a sensitive application to be widely used.
Thus, building up a true trust between our PHR application and its users is one of
the primary goals of this research. The steps required to fulfill this goal would be as
follows:
4.3.1 Reviewing current health related applications
There are quite a lot of health related applications for Android devices on Google Play
Store. In an attempt to discover if those applications have considered transparency
in giving information about providing access to critical documents to the users or
giving them the ability to set some rules for enabling or disabling access to specific
35
documents or actors in the system, three popular applications were installed and
assessed. The following gives a report about the experience.
“Personal Health Record PHR” 2, “Mobile Health Record” 3 and “Track My
Medical Records” 4 were the three applications that we assessed to see if they have
any means to build the required trust between them and their users.
Table 4.3.1 gives a brief information about the number of downloads, the required
permissions, the applications’ ratings and latest update date for the above three
applications.
Name Downloads Latest Update Required Permissions Play Store Rating
Personal Health Record PHR 5,000 - 10,000 July 29, 2016 full network access 2.9
Mobile Health Record 1,000 - 5,000 March 24, 2017
find accounts on the device, read your contacts,
read phone status and identity,
read the contents of your USB storage,
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage,
receive data from Internet,
control vibration, prevent device from sleeping 4.9
Track My Medical Records 10,000 - 50,000 November 8, 2013
view network connections,
full network access 3.9
Table 4.1: A summary of the three assessed health-related applications.
According to the above table, “Mobile Health Record” has the highest rating (4.9)
and at the same time the lowest number of downloads by the users. It also requires
many sensitive permissions to operate. “Personal Health Records PHR” has the
lowest rating (2.9) but has a slightly higher number of downloads. Its only required
permission request is to have full network access. On the other hand, “Track My
2Available at: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.drchrono.onpatient
3Available at: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.bidhee.familyhealthnepal
4Available at: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.freehealthtrack.free.health.track
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Medical Records” has a relatively high number of downloads and a fair rating of 3.9.
It requires viewing network connections and full network access to operate.
Among the three applications, one thing in common is requesting for full network
access. This is a really bold permission to give to an application that is related to one’s
sensitive health related information. Granting this permission to any application of
this kind can enable it to send patients’ information over the network to anywhere
without them even noticing. This is exactly where users start to second guess their
trust with such applications.
All these three applications’ functionalities were completely assessed and there
were no signs of any module that gives their users some kind of control on their
health related documents. Controls such as setting limitation on the audience of
some of the documents and setting notifications for accesses by specific roles in the
application or at least, to some special documents.
In Figure 4.3, you can see three screen-shots of the main menu of the three ap-
plications. As can be seen, there are no notification and access control modules
implemented in any of them.
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Upon receiving a notification, the user will be provided with the functionality to
revoke the access to the related document to the actor that initiated the notification
or they can simply dismiss it.
If the user dismisses a notification by a mistake or they change their mind about
a specific document, role or user, they can always browse through their stored audits
and take the desired actions accordingly. We believe that such a design makes the
most crucially sensitive aspect of our PHR application completely transparent to the
user hence, giving them more reasons to trust us and use our application.
The aim of designing the notification module is to make accessing a user’s sensitive
documents as transparent as possible.
Figure 4.5: The design of PHR application’s notification setting page.
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First of all, the user should be able to turn notification ’on’ and ’off’ on differ-
ent documents and roles. Figure 4.5 shows two muck-ups of the PHR application’s
setting page after the designed module is implemented. Figure 4.5(a) depicts the sit-
uation when the user wants to set notification rules on accesses to specific documents
and Figure 4.5(b) corresponds to setting notification rules on specific accesses from
particular users.
Upon accessing those documents that have notification enabled or the users that
are in the access-sensitive group, a notification will be issued from the PHR applica-
tion (Figure 4.6).
Figure 4.6: A PHR application’s notification showing up in the Android’s notification
center.
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When a user taps on their PHR notifications from the notification center, they
will be redirected to the notification page of the PHR application (Figure 4.7), where
they can instantly revoke the access notified to them or dismiss the notification.
Figure 4.7: A PHR application’s notification page with ”instant revoke” and ”dismiss”
functionalities.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
In this chapter, the software and hardware requirements and configurations regarding
TouchSense, the automatic model creation application and the continuous authenti-
cation module and its integration into the PHR application will be outlined, followed
by a brief description of the whole implementation process for each application.
5.1 TouchSense application
As discussed in the previous chapter, the design and implementation of the Touch-
Sense application was the first step to make creating a continuous authentication
module possible. Thus, in this section we will first explain the implementation pro-
cess of this application.
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5.1.1 Software environment
The application has been built using API 14: Android 4.0 (Ice Cream Sandwich) so
that it can run on most of the Android based smartphones both modern and older
ones. The reason this API level has been chosen for developing TouchSense is to find
as many willing users to participate in the data gathering phase, hence choosing a
higher API level would minimize our chances of finding enough participants.
The operating system used for developing this application was 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04
LTS (Xenial Xerus). Also, the Integrated Development Environment (IDE) used for
building, running and testing the application was Android Studio 2.1.2.
5.1.2 Hardware environment
All the implementation and build processes have been performed using a single node
desktop computer with the following hardware configuration:
• Installed memory (RAM): 8 GB.
• Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU @ 2.60 GHz.
Also, the run and test processes have taken place on a OnePlus 3T smartphone
with the following hardware details:
• Installed memory (RAM): 6 GB.
• Processor: 2.35GHz Qualcomm Snapdragon 821 quad-core.
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Once the user accepts to send the gathered data, the text file in the memory will
be uploaded to an Amazon S3’s bucket called “touch-info” along with the AndroidID
of the user’s smartphone. This AndroidID will be used as an identification parameter
that can uniquely distinguish a smartphone’s data among the other participants’ data
that reside on the “touch-info” bucket. Each raw file sent from a smartphone is named
in the following format:
AndroidID-Timestamp.txt
The following code snippet shows how AndroidID is retrieved from the device in
the TouchSense application:
String androidId =
android.provider.Settings.Secure.getString(getContentResolver(),
android.provider.Settings.Secure.ANDROID_ID);
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, no matter what the response of the user is, after
the pop-up is closed the NEXT button will change to START OVER. Once the user
touches the button, a new experiment will start and upon completion the data can
be sent as a new file to the Amazon S3 server, if only the user agrees.
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To automate the process of transforming the raw text files into arff files, and then
building the classifiers from the generated arff files, a J2EE application was developed.
In the following sections we will describe the software and hardware environments used
to develop this application and its implementation details.
5.2.1 Software environment
This application has been built using J2EE technology. Spring framework version
4.0.6.RELEASE has been used as the primary framework. For database interactions,
Hibernate version 4.3.6.Final has been utilized. Also the chosen database is MySQL
version 5.1.31. We have used Servlet API version 3.1.0 to enable a RESTful api
for our TouchSense application to send requests and receive responses. Also, the
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) used for building, running and testing
the application is IntelliJ IDEA 15.0.6.
5.2.2 Hardware environment
The hardware environment is the same as the environment used for developing Touch-
Sense. However, since this application is not a mobile application, there is no need to
test it on a smartphone. As a result, all the tests have been run on the same machine
that the development took place.
5.2.3 Implementation details
This application contains one RESTful API endpoint called ’/automate’ which han-
dles the following operations:
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• Reading all the raw files that reside in the “touch-info” bucket.
• Converting the raw files to appropriate arff files so that they can be used with
Weka’s API later on.
• Updating all the existing arff files with the new raw data received from Amazon
S3.
• Creating models based on the updated arff files.
• Uploading the created local models to Amazon S3’s “models-info” bucket to be
used in PHR, later.
• Deleting the local model files.
• Uploading the updated arff files to Amazon S3’s “arff-info” bucket.
• Deleting the local arff files.
• Deleting the local and remote raw files.
Throughout this chapter, pseudocodes are used to demonstrate the implementa-
tion process. For more details, refer to Appendinx A which contains the code snippets
of each pseudocode. The following pseudocode demonstrates a high level representa-
tion of what happens in the automate endpoint:
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1: myCredentials ← BasicAWSCredentials(ACCESSKEY, SECRETKEY)
2: s3Client ← AmazonS3Client(myCredentials)
3: readAllRawFilesAndConvertToArff(s3Client)
4: readAllArffFiles(s3Client)
5: updateArffFiles()
6: createModels()
7: uploadLocalModelsToS3(s3Client)
8: deleteLocalModelFiles()
9: deleteLocalRawFiles()
10: uploadLocalArffFilesToS3(s3Client)
11: deleteLocalArffFiles()
At line 3 of the above pseudocode, the readAllRawFilesAndConvertToArff() func-
tion will send a request to Amazon S3 server to list all the raw files that exist in the
“touch-info” bucket and downloads them all to the temp folder of the tomcat web
server that runs the application. After all the raw files are downloaded, the function
goes through each one of them and converts them to arff files, as described in Chapter
4.
It should be mentioned that after this process is done, all the other arff files
that are already inside Amazon S3’s “arff-info” bucket should be updated with the
information in the downloaded raw files. The update is done so that all the rows
of the new raw files will be added to the existing arff files as rows indicating the
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“Others” class, since those are features collected from another smartphone with a
different AndroidID. This is the reason why at lines 4 and 5 all the existing arff files
will be read from S3 and then will be updated using the updateArffFiles() function.
Then, at line 6, the createModels() function is called. This function uses Weka’s
Java API to build a classifier for each updated arff file which is stored in the temp
folder of the tomcat running the application. The below pseudocode shows how this
operation is done:
1: fileDirectory ← the path to tmp directory for arff files
2: modelDirectory ← the path to tmp directory for model files
3: if modelDirectory does not exist then
4: create the directory
5: for each arffFile in fileDirectory do
6: androidId ← first part of arffFile name
7: create an instance of RandomCommittee classifier
8: create an Instances object from Weka library using the content of the arffFile
9: set the class index of the Instances object
10: build the classifier using the Instances object
11: write the serialized classifer to modelDirectory using the androidId value for
the file name.
The above pseudocode shows that the createModels() function iterates through
all the arff files in fileDirectory. Extracts the androidId for each arff file from its
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file name at line 6. Then, at line 7, creates a classifier instance. In this example,
RandomCommittee has been used as a classifier. In order to train the classifier
instance, an Instances object should be created. Lines 8 to 10 show this operation by
reading an arff file into the instance object, called inst.
The class index is set for the instance object at line 9. At line 10, the classifier is
built based on the created instance object. Finally, at line 11, the created classifier will
be serialized into a file with androidId as the name and .model as the extention, in the
modelDirectory, so that later on it can be uploaded to our Amazon S3’s “models-info”
bucket for later use.
5.3 Continuous authentication module in PHR
As mentioned before, one of the main objectives of this research is to provide PHR
system with a continuous authentication mechanism. The target PHR system to
apply this security measure to, is the one implemented by Debnath et al. [13] for An-
droid devices. In the following sections, we will describe the implementation process
of this module in PHR.
5.3.1 Software environment
The application uses API 22: Android 5.1 (Lollipop) which is compatible with most
of the Android smartphones in the market, today. The operating system used for
developing this module is 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (Xenial Xerus). Also, the Inte-
grated Development Environment (IDE) used for building, running and testing the
application is Android Studio 2.1.2.
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5.3.2 Hardware environment
All the implementation and build processes have been performed using a single node
desktop computer with the following hardware configuration:
• Installed memory (RAM): 8 GB.
• Processor: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU @ 2.60 GHz.
Also, the run and test processes have been performed on an LG G3 smartphone
with the following hardware specification:
• Installed memory (RAM): 3 GB.
• Processor: 2.5 GHz quad-core Krait 400.
5.3.3 Implementation details
The automatic model creation application that was described in the previous section
takes care of creating the classifier model for each smartphone that has been involved
in an experiment via TouchSense, at least once. After the model is created, it will
be uploaded to the “models-info” bucket on an Amazon S3 server, ready to be used
by the PHR application. In the remainder of this section, we will describe how PHR
uses those created models in its continuous authentication module.
When a user runs their PHR application, the first thing the application does is
to send a request to Amazon S3’s “models-info” bucket along with the smartphone’s
AndroidID to lookup the classifier model created for that smartphone. Two scenarios
could happen:
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• The classifier model does not exist for the sent AndroidID: This
basically means that the owner of the smartphone hasn’t yet completed at least
one experiment using the TouchSense application. In this case, a popup will be
shown to the user indicating that in order to use the continuous authentication
feature, they need to install TouchSense and run the experiment. The URL to
TouchSense’s page on Google Play Store will be provided so that the user can
easily download the application and start to use it.
• The classifier model exists for the sent AndroidID: In this case, upon
receiving a success response from the first request, the PHR application sends
another request to download the designated classifier model into the application.
After sending the download request the model will be downloaded into the
memory and using Weka’s API for Android, the classifier will be instantiated
and ready in the memory to be used by PHR. The following pseudocode shows
the entire process of obtaining the assigned classifier model in PHR.
1: classifierFile ← the serialized .model file stored in the application context named
by the device’s androidId
2: if classifierFile does not exist then
3: fetch it from S3’s ’models’ bucket
4: testClassifier ← the instantiated classifer from classifierFile
5: create an instance of RandomCommittee classifier
6: let the keyboard use the testClassifier
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At line 3, the request to download a file named androidId + “.model” is sent to
S3. Then, at line 4 the testing classifier instance, named testClassifier will be created
using Weka’s Android API so that the classifier can be used in the memory.
Now that we have the testing classifier ready in the memory, let’s see how it
actually works. The following pseudocode shows the testing classifier in action.
1: define pressure, size, touchmajor, touchminor, duration, flytime, shake, orienta-
tion, and type as the attributes of the dataset
2: classValues ← [androidID, “Others”]
3: create a classAttribute instance and set it to classValues
4: create an Attributes instance and add all the attributes defined at line 1
5: create the empty dataset “touch” with the above attributes
6: when a touch happens gather all the values regarding each attribute and put it
in an instance of the “touch” dataset
7: prediction ← the result of calling the classifier’s classifyInstance function for the
created instance
8: if prediction equals 0 then
9: the touch belongs to the legit owner
10: keep a history of this event in the classifyResults list
11: else
12: the touch does not belong to the legit owner
13: keep a history of this event in the classifyResults list
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As can be seen from the above pseudocode, from line 1 to 5 the instance required
for the classifier to make a decision will be made based on the input features as
the user uses the custom keyboard to enter data. As the instance is instantiated,
the classifier’s classifyInstance() method will be called and it will return a double
value as the result. If the returned value is equal to 0, it means that the instance
belongs to the owner of the smartphone, hence it adds a value of ‘true’ to a list called
classifyResults. Otherwise, a value of ‘false’ will be added to the classifyResults list.
After each successful completion of typing a word or number, if the number of
‘true’ values in the classifyResults array list is above 70% of all the values in the
list, the user can continue using the PHR application. However, if at any time, this
value drops below 70%, the user will be automatically logged out, and will be asked
to enter their credentials to access PHR again. The pop-up showing the warning of
losing control of the current session is shown in Figure 5.4
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Figure 5.4: The user will receive an alert when the continuous authentication module
detects that they are no longer authorized to access the application.
When this module detects an access violation via the background classification
mechanism covered in Section 5, the user will immediately be informed and logged
out of the system. The user should provide some type of credentials to be able to
access the system again.
The type of credentials required could be set by the legit user of the application
during the registration process. The user can have different options such as entering a
password, challenge-response, two-way authentication and security questions to take
action after authentication is voided via the continuous authentication module.
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Chapter 6
Results
In this chapter, the results of the research will be outlined. First, details about
the participants of the TouchSense application, its usage and the geographical dis-
tribution of the participants will be illustrated. Then, a set of experiments about
both the gathered touch behavior dataset and the classifiers used in the continuous
authentication module will be run and their results will be described in details.
6.1 TouchSense usage results
The TouchSense application was installed 55 times in total, starting from the 16th of
March, 2017 until the 2nd of April, 2017. Figure 6.1 shows this information.
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leading versions that hosted TouchSense are Android version 6.0 and 7.0, respectively.
Figure 6.3: The percentage of installs on each Android version.
6.2 The effect of removing outliers in the gathered
data
To investigate the effect of outliers in the gathered data on the classifiers that are built
for each participant, we used ten datasets from ten different participants and applied
Weka’s “InterquartileRange” filter to detect the outliers in each dataset and removed
them using the “RemoveWithValues” filter. The original and the new datasets were
62
trained using J48 decision tree classifier and the results were compared together.
The interquartile range filter is an unsupervised filter that can be applied to
attributes of a dataset to detect outliers and extreme values and it works based
on interquartile ranges. Obviously, the filter skips the class attribute. Outliers are
computed using the following formula:
Q3 +OF ∗ IQR < x <= Q3 + EV F ∗ IQR (6.1)
With:
Q1 = 25% quartile
Q3 = 75% quartile
IQR = Interquartile range, difference between Q1 and Q3
OF = Outlier factor, the factor for determining the thresholds for outliers
EV F = Extreme value factor, The factor for determining the thresholds for extreme
values
Figures 6.4 to 6.7 plot Mean Absolute Error, False Positive Rate, Classifier Preci-
sion and ROC Area, respectively for 10 different participants’ classifier models named
using the AndroidId of each participant’s device. The classifier used in this experi-
ment is J48 decision tree. The blue marks depict the results for data with outliers
and the orange marks showcase the results for data without outliers.
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Figure 6.4: Mean Absolute Error for ten different AndroidIds.
The less the value of mean absolute error the better the performance of a classifier.
In Figure 6.4 it can be seen that in most of the cases the mean absolute error value
for the dataset without outliers is slightly less than the one with outliers, except for
the second device.
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Figure 6.5: False Positive Rate for ten different AndroidIds.
False positive rate is a very important indicator for us to assess the quality of the
built classifiers. In the continuous authentication case, it is less tolerable to classify a
non-legit user as the owner of a smartphone (False Positive) compared to classifying a
legit owner as a non-owner incorrectly (False Negative). Hence, the plot in Figure 6.5
illustrates the false positive rate for ten different participants’ classifiers and compares
the results for when the dataset contains outliers (blue marks) versus when the data
has no outliers (orange marks). The plot confirms that, however very slightly, but in
most cases the false positive rate is lesser when data has no outliers.
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Figure 6.6: Classifier Precision for ten different AndroidIds.
The classifier precision answers this question: “Given a positive prediction from
the classifier, how likely is it to be correct?” and this is a very important question.
If our classifier detects a touch behavior as a legit owner behavior or detects one as
a non-legit user, we would like to be as confident as possible about this decision.
Figure 6.6 shows the classifier precision for when data contains outliers (blue marks)
and when the data has no outliers (orange marks). This figure also confirms that the
precision is relatively better when the outliers are removed from the data.
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Figure 6.7: ROC Area for ten different AndroidIds.
The accuracy of a classifier can be measured by the area under the ROC curve.
An area of 1 represents a perfect result; an area of 0.5 represents a worthless result.
In Figure 6.7, the ROC area for 10 different participants’ classifiers can be seen for
when data contains outliers (blue marks) and when the data has no outliers (orange
marks). It can be concluded that the ROC area is greater for when the data lacks
outliers in most of the cases.
Generally, the four figures above confirm that our classifiers perform better when
the outliers are removed from the dataset. However, the difference is really insignifi-
cant. This can validate our data gathering approach, confirming that the users have
been reasonably honest when performing the experiments, i.e. they have been consis-
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tent throughout the whole experiment with their touch behavior. If there were lots
of differences in their behavior, we would have seen more outliers in our dataset and
as a result, this experiment would have shown more significant differences between
the classifiers’ performances in each category.
6.3 Evaluating the importance of each feature
Using our TouchSense application, we gathered nine features for each touch interac-
tion of the users with their smartphones. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the features
were as below. The values in the parentheses show the name of each attribute as
stored in the datasets.
• Pressure (pressure)
• Size (size)
• Touch major (touchmajor)
• Touch minor (touchminor)
• Touch duration (duration)
• Touch fly-time (flytime)
• Device’s vibration (shake)
• Device’s orientation (orientation)
• Type of the phrase whether word or number (type)
68
For this experiment, we used an attribute evaluator algorithm called “Correlation-
AttributeEval” from Weka to assess the contribution of each feature in our gathered
data and decide if we should eliminate some of them in order to obtain better perform-
ing classifiers or not. “CorrelationAttributeEval” evaluates the worth of an attribute
by measuring the correlation (Pearson’s) between it and the class.
We ran this algorithm for twenty different datasets of participants. Table 6.1 shows
the rank (correlation value) of all attributes for each dataset. In the last row, the
mean of the correlation values that each attribute has been assigned to is calculated.
Those with larger values contribute more and the ones with smaller values can be
regarded as the least contributing features.
First thing to notice when looking at Table 6.1 is that the correlation value for
the orientation feature is 0 for all the datasets. This is actually because none of the
participants used the TouchSense application in the landscape mode, although it was
functional in that mode as well. As a result, the orientation feature can be safely
removed from the dataset since it doesn’t contribute to it in any way.
There can be multiple reasons why none of the users used the landscape mode.
Generally, some users prefer to use their smartphones in the portrait mode. Also,
some users only use the landscape mode on their tablets which have bigger screen
sizes. Another reason can be the lack of an appropriate application design specific
to the landscape mode. The TouchSense application uses the same design for both
modes of operation, however, for a better user experience each mode should have its
own specific design.
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Item AndroidId pressure size touchmajor touchminor duration flytime shake orientation type
1 2befe3dcb10c2ad0 0.36080 0.42090 0.11480 0.11730 0.05390 0.32000 0.06030 0 0.09030
2 5b454e4ad8ae49f9 0.11290 0.10600 0.38550 0.27940 0.02290 0.01070 0.03220 0 0.08170
3 6ae57ac86337d0c8 0.37869 0.07620 0.48289 0.52376 0.04588 0.04008 0.17063 0 0.00615
4 17dbd51fc956e866 0.35120 0.14270 0.14090 0.16150 0.25130 0.08190 0.06880 0 0.05070
5 25bde1742e198e2b 0.25630 0.25890 0.18700 0.21030 0.03570 0.08220 0.09490 0 0.05400
6 27ca8bffd5d26872 0.16360 0.02660 0.13700 0.13300 0.01810 0.08140 0.09380 0 0.04090
7 69c6095d09e85e74 0.04420 0.13820 0.02990 0.01990 0.03450 0.05820 0.01410 0 0.08370
8 95f7f7d8b82fbe3a 0.40090 0.05220 0.52930 0.57250 0.07800 0.03940 0.04610 0 0.01670
9 401a0549143041f5 0.26280 0.37150 0.20966 0.20418 0.02637 0.07621 0.16616 0 0.00777
10 868cfad405c82e9a 0.20291 0.04274 0.05310 0.04326 0.14295 0 0.13646 0 0.02374
11 5351e9daeaa79450 0.17350 0.14050 0.14700 0.14610 0.02900 0.11130 0.06610 0 0.03980
12 3663248fa7abf026 0.11770 0.12880 0.01470 0.03190 0.21850 0.03870 0.06760 0 0.04460
13 a2f9246cfc48e9c9 0.14520 0.25060 0.14230 0.13830 0.03100 0.02540 0.05990 0 0.01900
14 a139bad3e9cef57e 0.24172 0.21156 0.13314 0.12906 0.03507 0.06503 0.09208 0 0.00689
15 b7d6def4b9f4c030 0.10390 0.18570 0.13700 0.13410 0.02040 0.06300 0.01520 0 0.02470
16 cb05c98191aebd7e 0.18240 0.17010 0.14130 0.14120 0.13410 0.03570 0.16100 0 0.01750
17 d2d0d48fc14007e9 0.14940 0.27960 0.13280 0.13810 0.09550 0.04560 0.03000 0 0.02970
18 e6c172ca6be05a41 0.35830 0.34000 0.19690 0.19030 0.01490 0.02610 0.05910 0 0.06040
19 eb1c0682c66e6379 0.03410 0.57360 0.23110 0.23130 0.30920 0.24230 0.16170 0 0.09630
20 fb58815420addb16 0.16426 0.17709 0.19923 0.11765 0.00954 0.08643 0.00577 0 0.07226
Mean 0.21024 0.20467 0.18728 0.18316 0.08034 0.07650 0.08010 0 0.04334
Table 6.1: The correlation values of all attributes for each device’s classifier. The first
column shows the AndroidId of each of the twenty participants’ smartphones. The
rest of the columns show the recorded attributes’ correlation values.
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Looking at the last row, based on the mean value of the correlation values for each
column the features can be ranked as bellow:
1. pressure (0.21024)
2. size (0.20467)
3. touchmajor (0.18728)
4. touchminor (0.18316)
5. duration (0.08034)
6. shake (0.08010)
7. flytime (0.07650)
8. type (0.04334)
Now that we have the ranking of our eight features, we will start by eliminating the
last ranked feature and create classifiers for six participants, and then will eliminate
the next least ranked feature and again will create classifiers with the new data set.
We do so, until we have eliminated three least significant features and will compare
the resulting classifiers with the original one which involves all the recorded features.
All the classifiers in this experiment have been built using J48 decision tree.
The following six figures show the ROC Area and precision changes of the resulting
classifiers when the three least contributing features are removed from the datasets
of six random participants, one after one.
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Figure 6.8: Feature reduction results for the participant with AndroidId:
95f7f7d8b82fbe3a.
Figure 6.9: Feature reduction results for the participant with AndroidId:
cb05c98191aebd7e.
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Figure 6.10: Feature reduction results for the participant with AndroidId:
a2f9246cfc48e9c9.
Figure 6.11: Feature reduction results for the participant with AndroidId:
6ae57ac86337d0c8.
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Figure 6.12: Feature reduction results for the participant with AndroidId:
868cfad405c82e9a.
Figure 6.13: Feature reduction results for the participant with AndroidId:
5351e9daeaa79450.
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As can be seen from the above figures, removing ’type’ from the features set leads
to a slight increase in the resulting classifiers’ precision and also enhances the ROC
Area value. Going further with removing the next feature which is ’flytime’ has a
more visible enhancement effect on the precision and ROC Area values in most of the
cases. However, in all the figures, it is apparent that moving forward and removing
’shake’, the third least significant feature, results in an obvious decrease in both the
precision and ROC Area of the resulting classifiers.
Having too many features in a dataset can lead to overfitted classifiers that do a
poor job on classifying new instances. On the other hand, too few features result in
extremely general classifier models that usually lack performance. We would like to
have a specialized but not over-fitted model while it is still general enough to perform
well on unseen instances. Hence, there is a trade-off to select the appropriate number
of features for our datasets, indeed. In this experiment, we showed that removing
the two least significant features in our dataset results in better precision and ROC
Area values. However, that is where we should stop reducing the dimensionality of
our dataset, since removing the next feature decreases the performance, significantly.
6.4 Deciding the best performing and most prac-
tical classifier
The last experiment is designed to help with deciding the best performing and most
practical classifier for our continuous authentication module. In this experiment,
we used ten random datasets, gathered using the TouchSense application from ten
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different participants and built four different classifier models for them using Multilay-
erPercepteron (NN), J48 decision tree (J48), RandomCommittee (RC) and BayesNet
(BN), all from Weka. Then, the resulting classifiers were compared together based
on 4 different criteria: Mean Absolute Error, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate
and ROC Area. The following figures illustrate the results of this experiment.
Figure 6.14: Mean Absolute Error values of four classifiers (NN, J48, RC and BN)
for ten different participants.
As can be seen in Figure 6.14, the mean absolute error value for BN and NN are
significantly worse than J48 and RC. However, J48 and RC have very close behavior
with RC showing a slightly better performance.
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 show the values of True Positive Rate (TPR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR) for the same ten participants, respectively.
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Figure 6.15: True Positive Rate values of four classifiers (NN, J48, RC and BN) for
the same ten participants.
Figure 6.16: False Positive Rate values of four classifiers (NN, J48, RC and BN) for
the same ten participants.
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According to Figure 6.15, BN has the best TPR when compared to the three
other classifiers. The other classifiers have a similar trend and RC is just slightly
better in having a higher TPR. However, at the same time, Figure 6.16 shows that
BN is the worst classifier when it comes to the FPR. This basically indicates the
trade off between TPR and FPR. Again, the three other classifiers are really similar
in behavior with NN having a small advantage.
As mentioned earlier, it is obvious that a rational business decision when trying to
build a model for continuous authentication is to design a classifier with a decent True
Positive Rate and most importantly a very low rate of False Positive. Considering
this, BN is instantly ruled out. Although it has the best True Positive Rate, it is
doing far worse than the other three classifiers when it comes to FPR. Among the rest
of the classifiers, NN has a very slightly better rate of FPR while being noticeably
worse in terms of TPR. Between RC and J48, the better performing classifier is RC
for having both better TPR and FPR than J48.
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Figure 6.17: ROC Area values of four classifiers (NN, J48, RC and BN) for the same
ten participants.
Finally, Figure 6.17 shows that RC has a better ROC Area value in comparison
with J48, which again confirms our choice. Although NN and BN have overall better
ROC Area values, their high FPR rules them out from being chosen as the best
performing classifier.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Security issues are among the most important factors that prevent a user from us-
ing computer applications, especially in case of applications that request access to
personal and private information. With the recent evolution in the way mobile appli-
cations are developed and used, more healthcare software is accessible to public. An
important barrier in the way of using such health related applications is that the users
usually have no intention to share their private health information in an untrusted
environment where many security challenges may exist.
One of the significant security issues with using sensitive applications in a smart-
phone is that in today’s market, the authentication mechanisms incorporated in these
“smart” devices are not smart enough. Entering a pin code, a password, a sequence
of touches on specific regions of the screen or a combination of these approaches are
the most frequently used methods in commercial smartphones.
There are also few devices that support scanning fingerprints to enable a more
robust authentication in exchange for a noticeably higher price. Also, face and voice
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recognition methods have been used for authentication purposes; however the per-
formance of these machine learning techniques are dependent on the quality of the
capturing devices and also the amount of noise in the surrounding environment.
Considering the touch dynamics of a user as a biometric trait, we proposed a
continuous authentication module that uses touch sensors - which are already built-
in all the commercial, touch-enabled smartphones - to capture the touch behavior of
a user continuously and decide if the flow of touch events belongs to them or not via
a classifier model.
We also proposed the design of a notification and audit module that provides
the users of our PHR application with detailed information about accesses to their
personal health documents by the different hierarchy of roles in the system, giving
them the possibility to revoke access to specific roles instantly, based on the received
notifications. They will also be able to see a full access history to each document they
own in the application, on-demand. We believe that adding this kind of transparency
and letting the users of an application know exactly how, when and with whom their
assets are shared will build the trust required for an application to be used widely
and readily.
There are some areas that this research can continue and evolve. The first sug-
gestion would be to keep track of the users’ touch behavior in the PHR application
and send their touch behavior data frequently to our Amazon S3 server to update the
existing arff files and consequently, the classifier models for all of the users, in order
to create better classifiers that take the gradual behavior of the users into account.
Right now, the user’s classifier models get updated only when a new user uses the
TouchSense application or a returning user runs a new experiment in the application.
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Another suggestion would be to provide a suitable design for the landscape mode
of the TouchSense application and encourage the users to use both modes of oper-
ation when using the application to gather meaningful information about a device’s
orientation and assess its effects on the resulting classifiers.
Finally, it was already mentioned that the existence of a notification module in
the PHR application is a vital addition. In this research the design of this module
was outlined. The next step would be to implement the design and add it to the PHR
application.
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Appendix A
Code Snippets of TouchSense and
PHR
This appendix includes all the code snippets that describe the implementation pro-
cess of the TouchSense application along with the modifications applied to the PHR
application to enable continuous authentication.
This function updates the arff files based on the received raw files. It then creates the
models from the updated arff files and uploads them to Amazon S3’s “model-info”
bucket.
1 @RequestMapping(value = {"/automate"}, method = RequestMethod.GET)
2 public String createModels(ModelMap model) throws IOException {
3 AWSCredentials myCredentials = new BasicAWSCredentials(ACCESS_KEY,
SECRET_KEY);
4 AmazonS3Client s3Client = new AmazonS3Client(myCredentials);
5 try {
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6 readAllRawFilesAndConvertToArff(s3Client);
7 readAllArffFiles(s3Client);
8 updateArffFiles();
9 createModels();
10 uploadLocalModelsToS3(s3Client);
11 deleteLocalModelFiles();
12 deleteLocalRawFiles();
13 uploadLocalArffFilesToS3(s3Client);
14 deleteLocalArffFiles();
15 } catch (AmazonServiceException ase) {
16 System.out.println("Caught an AmazonServiceException, " +
17 "which means your request made it " +
18 "to Amazon S3, but was rejected with an error response " +
19 "for some reason.");
20 System.out.println("Error Message: " + ase.getMessage());
21 System.out.println("HTTP Status Code: " + ase.getStatusCode());
22 System.out.println("AWS Error Code: " + ase.getErrorCode());
23 System.out.println("Error Type: " + ase.getErrorType());
24 System.out.println("Request ID: " + ase.getRequestId());
25 } catch (AmazonClientException ace) {
26 System.out.println("Caught an AmazonClientException, " +
27 "which means the client encountered " +
28 "an internal error while trying to communicate" +
29 " with S3, " +
30 "such as not being able to access the network.");
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31 System.out.println("Error Message: " + ace.getMessage());
32 } catch (Exception e) {
33 e.printStackTrace();
34 }
35
36 List<Smartphone> smartphones = service.findAllSmartphones();
37 model.addAttribute("smartphones", smartphones);
38 return "allsmartphones";
39 }
This function iterates through all the arff files and creates a serialized classifier for
each one and writes the created model in the models directory.
1
2 private void createModels() throws Exception {
3 File fileDirectory = new File(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir") +
"\\arffs");
4 File modelDirectory = new File(System.getProperty("java.io.tmpdir") +
"\\models");
5 if (!modelDirectory.exists()) {
6 modelDirectory.mkdirs();
7 }
8 for (File arffFile : fileDirectory.listFiles()) {
9 String androidId = arffFile.getName().split("\\.")[0];
10 classifier = new RandomCommittee();
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11 Instances inst = new Instances(
12 new BufferedReader(
13 new FileReader(arffFile)));
14 inst.setClassIndex(inst.numAttributes() - 1);
15 classifier.buildClassifier(inst);
16 SerializationHelper.write(modelDirectory.getPath() + "\\" + androidId
+ ".model", classifier);
17 }
18 }
This function sends a getObject request to S3 server and instantiates the classifier
model to be used in PHR.
1
2 private Classifier loadModel(String androidId) throws Exception {
3 File classifierFile = new
File(getApplicationContext().getFilesDir()+"\\"+androidId+".model");
4 AWSCredentials myCredentials = new BasicAWSCredentials(ACCESS_KEY,
SECRET_KEY);
5 AmazonS3Client s3Client = new AmazonS3Client(myCredentials);
6 S3Object modelObject = s3Client.getObject(MODELS_BUCKET, androidId +
".model");
7 if (modelObject == null) {
8 return null;
9 }else{
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10 try {
11 IOUtils.copy(modelObject.getObjectContent(), new
FileOutputStream(classifierFile));
12 } catch (Exception e) {
13 return null;
14 }
15 }
16 FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(classifierFile);
17 testClassifier = (Classifier) weka.core.SerializationHelper.read(fis);
18 if (testClassifier != null) {
19 mKeyboardView.setClassifier(testClassifier);
20 }
21 Message message = mHandler.obtainMessage();
22 message.sendToTarget();
23 return testClassifier;
24 }
This method gets all the features required for the classifier to classify an instance and
decides if a set of features belongs to the smartphone being used by the legit owner
or to the ”Others”.
1 private void testClassifier(float pressureAverage, float sizeAverage,
float touchMajorAverage, float touchMinorAverage, long elapsedTime,
long elapsedFlyTime, float speed, int orientation, int wordOrNumber) {
2 Attribute pressureAttribute = new Attribute("pressure");
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3 Attribute sizeAttribute = new Attribute("size");
4 Attribute touchmajorAttribute = new Attribute("touchmajor");
5 Attribute touchminorAttribute = new Attribute("touchminor");
6 Attribute durationAttribute = new Attribute("duration");
7 Attribute flytimeAttribute = new Attribute("flytime");
8 Attribute shakeAttribute = new Attribute("shake");
9 Attribute orientationAttribute = new Attribute("orientation");
10 Attribute typeAttribute = new Attribute("type");
11 ArrayList<String> myClassValues = new ArrayList<String>(2);
12 myClassValues.add(androidId);
13 myClassValues.add("Others");
14
15 // Create nominal attribute "classAttribute"
16 Attribute classAttribute = new Attribute("class", myClassValues);
17
18 // Create vector of the above attributes
19 ArrayList<Attribute> attributes = new ArrayList<Attribute>(9);
20 attributes.add(pressureAttribute);
21 attributes.add(sizeAttribute);
22 attributes.add(touchmajorAttribute);
23 attributes.add(touchminorAttribute);
24 attributes.add(durationAttribute);
25 attributes.add(flytimeAttribute);
26 attributes.add(shakeAttribute);
27 attributes.add(orientationAttribute);
96
28 attributes.add(typeAttribute);
29 attributes.add(classAttribute);
30
31 // Create the empty dataset "touch" with above attributes
32 Instances touch = new Instances("touch", attributes, 0);
33
34 // Make classAttribute the class attribute
35 touch.setClassIndex(classAttribute.index());
36
37 Instance inst = new DenseInstance(10);
38
39 // Set instance’s values for the attributes "pressureAttribute",
"sizeAttribute", and
40 //"classAttribute"
41 inst.setValue(pressureAttribute, pressureAverage);
42 inst.setValue(sizeAttribute, sizeAverage);
43 inst.setValue(touchmajorAttribute, touchMajorAverage);
44 inst.setValue(touchminorAttribute, touchMinorAverage);
45 inst.setValue(durationAttribute, elapsedTime);
46 inst.setValue(flytimeAttribute, elapsedFlyTime);
47 inst.setValue(shakeAttribute, speed);
48 inst.setValue(orientationAttribute, orientation);
49 inst.setValue(typeAttribute, wordOrNumber);
50 inst.setValue(classAttribute, androidId);
51
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52 // Set instance’s dataset to be the dataset "touch"
53 inst.setDataset(touch);
54
55 try {
56 double pred = classifier.classifyInstance(inst);
57 if(pred == 0){
58 classifyResults.add(true);
59 }else{
60 classifyResults.add(false);
61 }
62 } catch (Exception e) {
63 e.printStackTrace();
64 }
65 }
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